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JUANCARMONA AND JAMES SIMPSON 
For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta 
sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportu- 
nistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market 
opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising 
wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportu- 
nistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust 
between the principal and agent. Under these conditions, contemporaries often con- 
sidered the contract synonymous with "exploitation" and "impoverishment," terms 
frequently found in the more traditional literature on sharecropping. 
H
istorians of sharecropping  in southern Europe have usually emphasized 
its negative effects. In France, for example, sharecropping has tradi- 
tionally been considered a major cause of the stagnation of the rural econ- 
omy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Neither sharecroppers nor 
landowmers were thought to have had an incentive to make productive in- 
vestments, and the sharecropping contract was thought to have led to an 
increase in subsistence and a decline in commercial  agriculture.' By contrast, 
recent work by economic and development historians has emphasized the 
positive characteristics  of sharecropping  over a wide variety of historical and 
geographical ~ettings.~  Instead of considering sharecropping as irrational or 
The Journal  of  Economic Histov, Vol.  59, No.  2  (June  1999). O  The  Economic  History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
Juan Carmona is Profesor Visitante and James Simpson Profesor Titular, Departamento de Historia 
Econ6mica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos I11 de Madrid, 28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain. 
We have benefitted from discussions with Ann Carlos, Josep Colome, Alan Dye, Francesco Galassi, 
Shawn Kantor, Jonathan Liebowitz, BelCn Moreno, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jaime Reis, and Rich Sicotte. 
Earlier  versions of this article received useful comments  at the congress on "Land, Labour and Tenure:  the 
Institutional Arrangements of Conflict and Cooperation in Comparative Perspective" held at the University 
of Leicester in August  1996; at the congress on "Cambio institutional e historia economics" at the 
Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona in December 1996, and at seminars at the European University 
Institute, Florence and the Universidad Carlos El  de Madrid. Joel Mokyr, Jan de Vries andtwo anonymous 
referees also made helpful comments. Kyle Brinkrnan greatly improved the style. The usual disclaimers 
apply. Finally, the authors acknowledge funding from the Spanish government (PS94-0005). 
Desert, "Bilan tconomique," pp. 440-4 1; and Ho~an,"Economic  Theory,'' pp. 309-10,  together 
with the sources he cites. For the Italian literature, see especially the bibliography cited in Cohen and 
Galassi, "Sharecropping," p. 646, h.2; and Zamagni, Economic History, p. 70, h.58. 
Revision by  economists and economic historians of the traditional negative interpretations of 
sharecropping can be dated to Cheung, Theory, in  1969 and Reid, "Sharecropping," in 1973. The 
literature on the U.S. South has, in particular, made an important contribution to the wider debate. For The "Rabassa Morta " in Catalan Kticulture  291 
economically inefficient, this new literature stresses instead its contribution 
to the reduction of transaction costs for both landowner and sharecropper 
in the face of market imperfections. In this paper we explain why both sets 
of opinions about sharecropping may be correct. We argue that although 
sharecropping might indeed provide a successful solution to market ineffi- 
ciencies in "traditional" agriculture, rapid changes associated with eco- 
nomic development would require significant modifications to sharecrop- 
ping contracts. Increases in capital inputs and growing opportunity costs 
of agricultural labor because of increased urban demand would imply that, 
unless contracts were modified to reflect these changes, conditions for 
sharecroppers would be likely to deteriorate. This, we argue, explains the 
often-cited complaints of "exploitation" and "impoverishment" found in 
the traditional literature. 
In Catalonia, in northeastern Spain, both landowners and sharecroppers 
were convinced  that the local sharecropping  contract,  the rabassa morta, had 
played a major role in the expansion of commercial viticulture in the region 
from the late seventeenth century until the late nineteenth centu~y.~  The 
rabassa morta was unusual in that its duration was often for the life of the 
vineyard, which effectively implied that the contract was indefinite. For 
several centuries this institution was sufficiently flexible to adapt to chang- 
ing factor markets and the wider changes taking place within society. From 
the late nineteenth century, however, the increasingly capital-intensive na- 
ture of viticulture and the divergence of wages and wine prices significantly 
raised the possibilities of postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part 
of the sharecropper, and eroded the trust, or social capital, that had devel- 
oped over the previous centuries. Although sharecropping continued to be 
used, the conflicts that developed between the principal and agent in their 
attempts to adjust to the new situation raised transaction costs and therefore 
reduced significantly the efficiency of the rabassa morta contract. 
The article is divided into three sections. After a brief examination of the 
theory of sharecropping and its relevance to viticulture in the first section, 
the second shows why the long-term nature of the rabassa morta contract 
was suitable to the conditions of Catalan viticulture prior to the late 1880s. 
The final section considers both why landowners continued to use share- 
cropping contracts after the widespread destruction of viticulture by  the 
disease phylloxera, and why, especially after the First World War, the con- 
tracts were much less efficient in providing stable conditions for viticulture 
in the region. 
a recent and easily available general survey of the sharecropping literature: see Otsuka, Chuma, and 
Hayami, "Land and Labor Contracts," pp. 1965-2018. 
See, for example, the editors' (Bemaldo de Quir6s and Aragdn Montojo) report for the Institute de 
Reformas Sociales (hereafier IRS), La  "rabassa morta, "pp. P-10. Carmona and Simpson 
SHARECROPPINGAND VITICULTURE 
In an important paper, Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Arrnen 
Alchian argue that after a specific investment has been made, creating appro- 
priable quasi rents, the possibility of postcontractual opportunistic  behavior 
"is very real."4 Vines are highly specialized to land, and not only is output 
sensitive to the quality and timing of labor inputs, but vines are easily and 
permanently damaged if the pruning, ploughing, and hoeing operations are 
badly carried out.'  Close monitoring of wage labor in traditional viticul- 
ture-to  reduce the risks of opportunistic behavior-was  costly, and would 
have been unprofitable for most landowners because the vast majority of 
wines produced were of poor quality and sold cheaply. Furthermore, prior 
to the twentieth century, there were few economies of scale in the production 
of either grapes or wine. Only with a handful of wines, such as the high 
quality sherries, ports, and clarets which, for example, sold for eight or ten 
times more than "ordinary" wines on the London market in the 1860s, was 
there an incentive for landowners to establish wine estates and use wage 
labor.6  Instead, most vineyards in the Mediterranean basin were small and 
worked by landowners using family labor. 
The use of rental contracts would have resolved landlords' monitoring 
problems by allowing tenants to enjoy all the benefits from improved culti- 
vation in the form of increased output. Yet rental contracts were rarely found 
in viticulture because of the possibilities of postcontractual opportunistic 
behavior and moral hazard. In the first instance, in the advent of a tenant 
claiming to be unable to pay the rent, the landowners faced difficulties in 
determining whether a poor harvest was the result of climatic factors, or of 
the agent's idleness.' In viticulture, this problem was made even more dif£i- 
cult than with most other crops by the frequently inverse relationship be- 
tween harvest size and quality. Second, tenants with contracts lasting only 
a few years would be tempted to increase output through a light pruning, an 
action which shortened the productive life of the vine. Even with long-term 
contracts, the landlord ran the risk of receiving back a dying vineyard once 
the tenant's lease expiredS8  Only indefinite contracts would give tenants a 
long-term economic interest in the vineyard. However, indefinite contracts 
based on a fixed annual payment were likely to lead to distributional con- 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, "Vertical Integratioq" p. 298. 
Galassi, "Tuscans," pp. 78-83. See also Hoffman, "Economic Theory." 
See Pan-Montojo and Simpson, "El comercio intemacional." For example, in Jerez, the Domecq 
estate had 200 acres (80 hectares) of vines in 1831. Busby, Journal, p. 17. In  Bordeaux, Ch$teau 
Margaux in 1922 had 227 acres of vines. Faith, Chdteaeau Margaux, p. 5 1.
'Bardhan, Land, p. 161;Galassi, "Tuscans,"  p. 82; and, Hayami and Otsuka, Economics,p. 3. 
On occasions, such as the approach of phylloxera, landowners might wish to maximize production 
even if it implied destroying  the vineyard. Evidence suggests  that it took about five years to exhaust the 
vines. IRS, La  "rabassa morta, "p. 92; see also Roig Armengol, Memoria, p. 179. l%e "Rabassa Morta" in Catalan Eticulture  293 
flicts. Future wine prices were impossible to forecast, so perpetual fixed 
monetary rents were impractical. Although this problem could be solved by 
using a fixed, annual payment in kind, landlords ran the risk that their rela- 
tive share of the harvest would decline during periods of high wine prices 
(tenants would maximize output, but at the cost of shortening the vineyard's 
life), or of losing their tenants during those of falling prices (tenants would 
find that the rent was higher than the marginal productivity of their labor). 
Indefinite sharecropping contracts overcame the problems of monitoring 
and moral hazard by providing both parties with a direct interest in optimiz- 
ing output over the vineyard's life, which, if dead or dying vines were re- 
placed, might stretch over several centuries. In Catalonia, a peculiar feature 
of the local sharecropping contract was that the rabasser (sharecropper) not 
only planted the vines but also legally owned themS9  Therefore, although 
contracts required the rabasser to cultivate the vines in accordance with the 
customs of the region, it was the fact that the vines were their own property, 
and could be sold, which provided the best incentive for their proper care.1° 
This offered two important benefits for the landowner: problems of moral 
hazard were significantly  reduced, and monitoring was enforced through the 
market. For the rabassers, the fact (prior to the twentieth century) that they 
were allowed to keep at least two-thirds of the harvest provided a "high- 
powered" incentive to utilize more oftheir labor in the vineyards, rather than 
in other activities." As a result, at times of high wine prices the landowner 
would also benefit from the light pruning of vines and greater care provided 
by the rabasser. When prices were weaker, the quantity and quality of the 
sharecropper's labor inputs might decline, but in such conditions the land- 
owner would have had difficulties  finding better tenants. For landowners the 
great advantage ofthe rabassa morta was that it allowed marginal land to be 
planted at no expense or risk to themselves, and that it minimized monitoring 
costs on annual cultivation. For the rabasser, it provided an opportunity to 
While emphyteusis contracts allow the tenant the possibility to sell to a thitd party the right to use 
the land (dominium utile),  the rabassa morta granted ownership of the vines, but only while they were 
productive. The rabassers had no claim to the land. 
lo The major  constraints on vine ownership were that the rabasser  could not  sublet, and the 
landowner had to approve the purchaser in the event of the rabasser wishing to sell. This is in line with 
the argument in Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, "Vertical integration," p. 320 that the "party who plants 
the trees or vines" also usually owns them. But it contradicts the argument of Hart and Moore, Property 
Rights, p. 1124, that "assets that are highly complementary should be owned together." If the landlord 
had owned the vines, not only would the incentives for the sharecropper to invest in the vineyard have 
been reduced, but they might have been tempted to exhaust the vineyard and then leave. This article 
shows that the separation of ownership of the land from the vines provided incentives  which contributed 
to the successful working of the contract for several centuries. Only with the changed circumstance of 
the early twentieth century did separate ownership create friction between the two parties in the way 
that Hart and Moore suggest. 
I'  For a discussion on this  problem, see Holmstrom and Milgrom, "Multitask Principal-Agent 
Analyses," especially pp. 26-27  and 35-36. 294  Carmona and Simpson 
obtain a capital asset, which could be sold, mortgaged, or inherited by one 
of his children. 
One potential problem for both landlords and tenants is that of contract 
enforcement.  Not only must opportunism be detected, but it may have to be 
proved before a court of law. Designing a contract which covers all future 
contingencies  is difficult, and recourse to litigation is often slow and expen- 
sive. Yet  in many traditional societies, including eighteenth- and early- 
nineteenth-cenhuy Catalonia, oral contracts were common. Problems of 
postcontractual  opportunistic  behavior were controlled in Catalonianot only 
by dividing the ownership of the land and vines and the use of the market, 
but also through reputation. Reputation, or social capital, was built up over 
time, and allowed large savings to be made in transaction costs. Residing in 
small villages, short-term opportunism by either party would be easily iden- 
tified by others and therefore affect the opportunist's reputation within the 
community.12  The cost of breaking an unwritten contract carried more than 
just social sanction by the local community; it also increased the risk, and 
hence cost, for other individuals to do  business in the future with that 
person.13 So long as sharecroppers identified their economic interests as 
being similar to those of the landlord, and so long as the landlord wished to 
attract good tenants, reputation played an important role in the successful 
enforcement of long-term contracts. Only from the late nineteenth century 
would this situation start to change, with both parties' interests being in- 
creasingly directed along class lines, thereby undermining the "good will" 
necessary for the sharecropping contracts to operate efficiently, and raising 
monitoring costs. 
For an institution such as the rabassa morta to last over several centuries 
it had to exhibit considerable flexibility in the face of changing relative 
prices and technology. In the rest ofthis article we examine more closely the 
working of the rabassa morta, dividing the period into two major parts, first 
from the introduction  of the contract with the initial planting of the vineyards 
in the late seventeenth century to the coming of phylloxera in the late nine- 
teenth century, and second fiom the replanting of the vines following phyl- 
loxera to the major conflicts of the 1920s. 
CATALAN VITICULTURE IN THE AGE OF EXPANSION, 1670s-1880s 
Discriminatory taxation by Britain against French wines and spirits from 
the second half of the seventeenth century, and the Dutch ban on French 
imports with the outbreak of war between the two countries in 1672,marked 
IZ In other words, "each agent needs to evaluate the effects of his current actions on his reputational 
capital." Hayami and Otsuka, Economics, p. 57. 
l3 Hayami, Development Economics, pp. 244-61. The "Rabassa Morta" in Catalan Viticulture  295 
the beginning of an important expansion of Catalan viticulture which lasted 
until the disease phylloxera devastated the region's vines in the late 1880s.14 
Initially, exports from the region consisted mainly of spirits (aguardiente), 
rather than wines themselves.I5  Spirits had three important advantages: they 
kept much better than wines, transport costs when measured by alcoholic 
strength were significantly reduced, and the poor quality of local wines was 
unimportant. The disadvantage of spirits was the lower prices producers 
received for their wines.I6 By the early nineteenth century an increasing 
number of growers had successfully switched to the production and export 
of table wines, relegating poor quality or surplus production to the still. This 
change was facilitated by the building of new roads linking areas of wine 
production with Barcelona and other ports, which reduced transport costs. 
Improvements in product quality allowed an increase in urban wine con- 
sumption, and in general were achieved with existing technologies." 
Estimates of the area under vines in Catalonia before 1860  are both scarce 
and unreliable. The commercial expansion of viticulture appears to have 
taken place in a series of stages, with the production frontier located near the 
coast in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, before moving 
inland along the valleys. The mountainous interior and poor communications 
caused the process to be slow, despite generally favorable wine prices. Thus 
the major period of expansion in Vilafranca, which is about 20 kilometers 
from the coast and was the center of the important wine area of the Penedes, 
took place between the second quarter of the eighteenth and the second 
quarter of the nineteenth centuries.  ls By 1860  the coastal provinces of Barce- 
lona, Tarragona, and Gerona had already reached 88 percent of their maxi- 
mum extension of vines. The final important movement of the frontier, 
which started from the early 1850s and lasted until the middle 1880s, was 
driven by a combination of rising international wine prices and improve- 
ments in internal communications brought about by the railways. This time 
it was the inland province of Lerida which benefitted most, where the area 
l4 For the international wine market, see especially Unwin, Wine,p. 238; andNye, "Myth," pp. 35-39. 
l5 A few luxury wines, especially Malmsey, were also produced. Quantities, however, were small 
so it is sufficient for us to consider only spirits and table wines. 
l6  Between 1821 and 1835the price ofwine in San Pere de Ribes was about the same as aguardiente 
in Reus, in spite of the latter being around three times stronger. Colome and Valls, "La viticultura 
catalana," p. 48. 
l7 To help conservation, wines were usually strengthened before exporting or selling in the major 
urban centers. 
l8 Moreno (La contractacid agrdria, table 1, p. 177) suggests 1740 as a starting date, while Colomt 
and Valls ("La viticultura catalanq" table 3, p. 50) suggest expansion from about 1725. Barba i Roca 
(Elcorregiment ipartit de Vilafianca, p. 75) complained at the end of the eighteenth century that the 
production of aguardiente in Vilafranca  was restricted because of the poor road between this town and 
its nearest port, Vilanueva 296  Carmona and Simpson 
ofvines doubled from 60,000 hectares to 120,000  hectares injust 25 years.19 
By the middle 1880s, and with the beginning of the devastation by phyllox- 
era, the four Catalan provinces had around 400,000 hectares of vines.20 
Much of the expansion of viticulture occurred in areas of low population 
density and on marginal land which often had been used as rough pasture 
or woodland.21  The task of land clearing and planting of vines was espe- 
cially arduous, often requiring more than 250 days of labor per hectares2* 
In addition, there was a wait of roughly four years before a respectable 
harvest was forthcoming. One estimate, which does not include the ex- 
penses for land clearing, gives depreciation and interest costs for planting 
as equivalent to 27 percent of total annual cultivation expenditure over 
fifty years.23  This high figure, together with the uncertain annual incomes 
caused by  fluctuating yields and prices, would have imposed a severe 
obstacle on the spread of the vine if growers had had to resort to capital 
markets. In traditional viticulture, however, virtually all the planting costs 
were for manual labor, and most of this could be supplied during those 
times of the year when the opportunity cost of family labor was low. The 
rabassa morta contracts required the rabasser to clear the land and to plant 
vines within a fixed period (usually between two and ten years), to culti- 
vate the vines in accordance with the customs of the region (us i costum de 
bon page's), and to hand over the previously agreed share of the annual 
harvest to the owner.24  The rabasser's limited savings and difficulties in 
obtaining commercial loans were partly offset by the cultivation of subsis- 
tence crops between the vines until they came into production. The con- 
tracts were originally valid until two-thirds of the vines had died, hence the 
Catalan name rabassa morta, meaning "dead vine." This implied that the 
contracts would last for several generations, although until at least the mid- 
nineteenth century the contracts were effectively indefinite, for reasons 
which will be explained s~bsequently.~' 
l9 Estimates of the area under vines are based on Garrabou and Pujol, "El canvi agrari,"  pp. 80-82; 
and Ministerio de Fomento, La invasidnjlox4rica, pp. 103-20. 
20 Phylloxera was first noted in the province of Gerona in 1878. It initially spread only slowly, in part 
because the high wine prices encouraged growers to use costly chemicals to delay it. With the sharp 
drop in wine prices in the late 1880s, the disease spread quickly. See Iglesies, La  crisi agraria; and 
Carnero Arbat, Expansidn vinicola. 
21 In 1730, for example, two-thirds of all land under vines had previously been uncultivated in Alt 
Penedks, half in Alt Camp and three-quarters in Bages. Valls, La dindmica, table 4.6. 
22 The cost of land clearing comes from Garrabou, Pujol, and Colomt, "Estabilidad," p. 47, although 
they fail to give a source. Tax sources for 1879 give 438 days in San Sadumi d'Anoia and 254 in 
L'Anoia  Colomt, L 'Especialitzacid viticola, p. 324. 
23 IRS, La  "rabassa morta, "pp. 159163. Costs are divided almost exactly between plowing (51.5 
percent) and labor (48.5 percent). No figures are given for the purchase of manure or vines. 
24 Giralt, "El conflict0 rabassaire,"  pp. 56-57. 
25 Continuity was guaranteed by the fact that under Catalan inheritance,  property passed to a single 
heir (the Izereu). Santamaria La rabassa morta, p. xi. The "Rabassa Morta" in Catalan Eticulture  297 
While long-term contracts and the rabasser's  ownership of the vines 
helped to solve the problems of moral hazard, an appropriate division of the 
harvest was crucial in creating incentives for the rabasser to maximize out- 
put over the life of the vineyard. Although recent sharecropping literature 
has argued that the division of the harvest is commonly fixed at an arbitrary 
fifty-fifty split between the sharecropper and the landowner, such was not 
the case in Catal~nia.~~  Catalonian landowners and sharecroppers had con- 
siderable flexibility in determining the share of the annual harvest that was 
payable as rent. As inputs were limited almost totally to land and labor in the 
pre-phylloxera period, the size of the annual payment depended on the esti- 
mated labor requirements needed to plant the vines and the potential fertility 
of the soil. Because of the heavy use of labor in planting, and the modest 
yields of traditional agriculture in this region, the initial contracts frequently 
required the rabasser to hand over only a comparatively small share of the 
harvest, usually between a fifth and a third. As a result, the sharecropper 
received a significant share of the marginal product of his labor. 
Another reason for the success of the rabassa morta before the twentieth 
century was the absence of economies of scale in traditional viticulture. The 
size of the rabasser's plots were therefore usually small. For example, in 
Bages rabassers worked on average 2.2 hectares, with two-thirds working 
less than 1.5hectares, while in San Sadurni d'hoia  (Penedks) two-thirds of 
the rabassers worked less than 2 hectares, and a third between 2 and 5 hect- 
are~.~~ In Gelida (Baix Llobregat) in  1862, although 96 percent of vines 
belonged to owners who had more than 5 hectares, 78 percent of all vines 
were actually farmed in units of less than 5 hectare^.^' In Catalan viticulture 
ploughs were not common before the late nineteenth century (making the 
need to own work animals unnecessary), only a few hand tools were re- 
quired (pruning knives, hoes), and until the appearance  ofnew diseases from 
the 1850s  no chemicals were used.29  The scale ofproduction in wine making 
was also small, and capital requirements consequently limited, allowing 
most rabassers to make their own wine. The size of most fermenting vats 
(lagares) was around 50 hectoliters, which corresponded to a yield of about 
3 hectares, the approximate  production of a single share~ropper.~~  Similarly, 
l6 Murrell ("Economics") claims that the 50 percent division served as "a golden rule" ofjustice. See 
also Hayami and Otsuka, Economics, pp. 78, 80-81;  and Otsuka, Chuma,  and Hayami, "Land," 
pp. 1969 and 1977. 
l7 Ferrer, Pageses, p. 260. Valls (La  diizrimica, p. 168) gives an average of 2 hectares in L'Anoia for 
the eighteenth century. 
Calculated from Colomk, L 'especialitzacid  viticola, pp. 315 and 550. 
29 Junta Consultiva Agronomica, Avance estadistico,  p, xxxi;and Koig Armengol, Memoria, pp. 178 
and 179. 
According to Ferrer (Pageses,pp. 162-63), most vats were between 30 and 100 hectoliters in Bages 
region in 1860, the equivalent to the production of about 1.5 to 6 hectares. Roig Armengol (Memoria, 
p. 215) writing of the same area noted that, "the  supply of wine is found in the hands of hundreds of 298  Carmona and Simpson 
the large part of commercial production initially devoted to spirits had low 
capital requirements. Local stills (olles and  famines) were cheap inconstruc- 
tion and required a minimum of skill to operate, although the spirits they 
produced were of a poor quality. 
Although contemporaries were in no doubt of the ubiquity of the rabassa 
morta contracts, it is difficult to determine exactly what percentage of the 
region's vines were cultivated using them. One rough estimate for the early 
1920s suggests that rabassa morta contracts covered between one-half and 
two-thirds of all vines cultivated in the important  provinces of Barcelona and 
Tarrag~na.~' When the rabassa morta was not used, vines were either culti- 
vated directly by the landowner using predominantly family members for 
labor, or were cultivated using another form of sharecropping, the maso- 
~eria.~~ The masover was a landowner's agent who lived in the main farm- 
house and oversaw operations,  particularly that of wine making.33  However, 
and in contrast to the mezzadria in Tuscany, a major feature of rabassa 
morta prior to phylloxera was the high level of independence that the 
rabasser enjoyed, and the low level of managerial input and monitoring 
requirements undertaken by landowner or rna~over.~~ 
Despite the fact that landowners and rabassers successfully devised a 
contract which overcame most problems associated with moral hazard, 
monitoring and incentives,  the length of the contract raised a different prob- 
lem as social and economic conditions of the region and the nature of viticul- 
ture itself changed. Three areas of  conflict can be  identified: 
changes in civil law, movements in relative prices, and the allocation of new 
costs arising out of changes in taxation or cultivation requirements. We shall 
examine each in turn. 
One difficulty was the interpretation ofthe length ofthe contract itself. As 
we have seen, the traditional rabassa morta contracts were supposed to 
remain in operation until two-thirds of the vines had died. However, unless 
afflicted by disease all the vines were unlikely to die at once, and it was in 
small growers, and those cellars with between a thousand or two thousand hectoliters, are considered 
as extraordinary." 
31 IKS, La  "Rabassa Morta, "map, pp. 19-20.  In the villages of Gelida and Los Monjos (PenedBs), 
the  figure  in  1862  was  73  and  75 percent  of  vines  respectively. Calculated  from  Colome, 
L 'especialitzacid viticola, pp. 315, 550, and Arnabat, La Gert, pp. 73, 77. In the Bages in 1860, the 
figure was between 60 and 81 percent. Ferrer, La vinya, p. 157. 
32 In Gelida in 1862,65 percent of rabassers also worked vines on land that they owned themselves, 
although this represented only 5 percent of all vines. Colome, L 'especialitzacid viticola, p. 550. 
33 Complaints of opportunistic  behavior on the part of the masover were frequent, and the landowner 
tried to solve these by taking special care over choosing  candidates  and providing  renewable, short-term 
contracts (Aguil6 y Cortes, La  tierra labrantia, pp. 93-95,  mentions three years) under especially 
favorable conditions (thereby raising the cost for the masover who was dismissed for shirking or other 
post contractual opportunistic behavior). 
34 As the name suggests, the rabassa morta was only associated with vines. Again, in contrast with 
Tuscany and the mezzadria, the mature vines were rarely cultivated with other crops. The "Rabassa Morta jJ in Catalan Mticulture  299 
neither parties' interest to see harvests slowly decline because dead or dying 
plants were not being replaced. Furthermore, the clause that the rabasser 
should follow the "good farming practices" of the region was widely inter- 
preted to imply that they should replant a dead or dying vine by  trailing 
shoots from a neighboring plant. Once the shoot had taken root, it was de- 
tached from the mother plant. Therefore, until the disease phylloxera made 
its appearance in the region in the 1880s the vineyard's life was often con- 
sidered indefinite. 
Some contemporaries claimed that by allowing sharecroppers to replant, 
the rabassa morta was little different from other contracts found in Spain, 
such as the  foro in Galicia, implying that ownership of the dominium utile 
was in the hands of the tenant, who simply had to pay an annual rent 
(censo). The attempts at stricter legal definition of land ownership in the 
eighteenth century made owners take more seriously the question of the 
vineyard's natural life. In 1765 Catalonia's highest court (Real Audiencia 
de Cataluiia) made the replanting of dead vines illegal, which provoked a 
reaction by the rabassers. However, it was not in the land owners' interest 
to receive back a dying vineyard and consequently their angle of attack 
changed. In 1778 the Real Audiencia de Cataluiia declared that replanting 
could take place, but the life of the vineyard was to be taken as 50 years. 
In 1793 the Council of Castilla ruled that the life of the vineyard could not 
be taken as an arbitrary 50 years, and so the question was left open once 
again.35  The potential problem of land ownership appeared once more, in 
1873, when a new law identified the rabassa morta, along with other con- 
tracts such as the foro, as being perpetual and gave the sharecropper the 
legal right to purchase the land if they so wished. However, the law was 
quickly revoked, and the new civil code of 1889 considered the length of 
the contract as being 50 years, unless some other fixed term had been es- 
tablished between the two parties. The rapid destruction of vines by phyl- 
loxera would make this new decision irrelevant. 
One source of information on how this changing legal framework affected 
landowners might be found in modifications  to the contracts themselves. Yet 
the legal rulings do not seem to have had an immediate effect. A notary in 
the Penedbs district still drew up some 90 percent ofthe new contracts by the 
natural life of the vines in the 1820s, although by the 1850s the figure had 
fallen to 55 percent, and by  the 1880s no contracts had indefinite terms.36 
The explanation for this delayed response can be found in the movements in 
commodity prices compared to labor costs. As Figures 1 and 2 show, condi- 
j5Balcells, Elproblema agrario, pp. 41-43. 
j6Pares Goncer,  "Contratacionnotarial agraria," pp. 6-19.Animportant problem withusing written 
contracts to measure change over time is  that they  sometimes simply  legalized what had  been 
previously an oral contract. See, for example, the criticism of Moreno (La contractacid agraria, 




TRENDS IN WINE PRICES AND WAGES IN BARCELONA, 1702-1805 

Notes: Five-year moving averages have been used (1730-1750 = 1). 
Sources:Calculated from Feliu, Precios, vol. 1, pp. 42-44, 87-92,  and 122-24. 
tions for production appear to have been especially favorable during the 
periods 1690  to 1740  and 1840  to 1885,  with the wine-to-wheat ratio moving 
above the long-term trend.37  By contrast, conditions seem to have worsened 
at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. This 
fact, together with the legal changes outlined above, helps to explain the 
slow changes in the rabassa morta contracts. While the legal disputes of the 
late eighteenth century might be expected to have encouraged landowners 
to specify in the contracts an exact number of years, rather than to rely on 
the vague concept of the death of two-thirds of the vines, the weakness in 
wine and spirit prices from the late 18  10s to the late 1840s made it difficult 
for owners to attract new sharecroppers. 
Second, there was also a small but clear increase in the share of the har- 
vest that new sharecroppers  had to pay the landowner during the period 1850 
37 It should be noted that information comes from commercial centers and that, especially prior to 
the railways, many farmers in other areas of Cataluiia might have faced a very different set of prices. 
Furthermore, agricultural wages give only a very rough indication of the opportunity cost of labor, as 
the use of wage labor was rare outside of the harvest. Information is unavailable for the period from 
1805 to 1820. The "Rabassa Morta " in Catalan Eticulture  301 

2.00  wine 1 wheat 
ri 












TRENDS IN WINE PRICES AND WAGES IN BARCELONA, 18261933 

Notes: Five-year moving averages have been used (18561870 = 1). 

Sources:Calculated  from Balcells,  Elproblema agrario, pp. 376-79;  andGarraboy Pujol, and Colomt, 

"Salaris,"  pp. 40-42 and 46. 

to 1885 compared to the period 1800 to 1845, as can be seen in Figure 3. 
This increase might have been caused either by landlords taking advantage 
of better wine prices that producers enjoyed after 1850, or by the need of the 
landlords to offset new costs. One such cost was the first appearance of 
oidium (powdery mildew) in the region in 1852, which required sulphur to 
be  sprayed during most years, and which was assessed as 15 percent of 
production costs by the tax authorities in 1  863.38  Another new cost was the 
land tax of 1845, which in the Bages and Penedes was considered the land- 
owner's legal responsibility,  although the rabassers contributed a part to the 
landowner; in Pla del Llobregat, the situation was reversed.39 
While the rabasser could end the contract by selling his vines, the land- 
owner could only recover full possession of the land if the rabasser failed 
to comply with the conditions stipulated in the contract. Yet the comparative 
advantage that Catalan farmers enjoyed in viticulture before the twentieth 
38 Giralt, Histdria Econdmica, p. 230. 
39 Ibid., pp. 153-54.  However, the rabasser benefitted from the abolishing of various taxes of the 




TREND IN THE SHAREOF THE HARVEST  PAID  BY  THE "RABASSERS"IN 

ALT PENEDES, 18 15-1880 

Note: Information refers to new contracts signed before a public notary. 
Source: Calculated from Colome, "Les formes d'acces,"  p. 138. 
century implies that this contractual imbalance was rarely a problem for 
landowners, and there appear to have been few attempts to evict tenants for 
inefficient cultivation. While legal costs can partly explain the infrequency 
of litigation, incentives also worked against contractual disputes. At times 
of high wine prices, such as in the 1870s,  both rabassers' and landowners' 
interests coincided in the need to maximize output from the land.40  When 
prices were weak, such as at the end of the nineteenth century, or when the 
supply of family labor was considered by the rabasser as excessive for the 
area of land, there was an incentive for the rabasser to look for part-time 
employment off the farm. Wage labor was rare in Catalan farming except 
during harvests, although where landowners worked some of their own land 
skilled labor was required for such tasks as pruning. Of greater importance 
were the employment opportunities found in rural industry in regions such 
as Bages or L'Anoia. For the landlords, a long period of low wine prices 
made it difficult to find good substitutes if they wanted to replace a share- 
40For the question of legal costs, see Santarnaria,  La rabassa morta, p. 123. The "Rabassa Morta " in Catalan Eticulture  303 
cropper. Furthermore, the low opportunity cost of much of the land discour- 
aged switching away from vines and into other crops. 
SHARECROPPINGAND CONFLICTS, 1890s-1920s 
The external shocks that both parties experienced during our first period 
were mild compared to those that began to strike at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Wine production in Catalonia fell significantly  from the early 1890s 
because of phylloxera, a disease which would in time destroy virtually all of 
Europe's vines. The only effective long-term solution to the disease was to 
uproot dead vines and replant the vineyards with American phylloxera-resis- 
tant stock, which were then grafted with European varieties. As French 
vineyards suffered first, this remedy was already known in Catalonia and the 
technical problem was therefore limited to one of adaptation; namely, deter- 
mining which varieties were most suited to local conditions, and instructing 
growers on the new cultivation techniques required. 
A second shock to Catalan viticulture was that wine prices, which had 
doubled over the fifteen years between 1869 to 1871 and 1884 to 1886 as a 
result of France's heavy imports to make up the shortfall in its domestic 
production, started to decline from the late 1880s,  just as phylloxera began 
to devastate Catalonia's own vines. From the early twentieth century the 
widespread replanting of vines throughout Europe, the increase in output in 
new wine-producing countries such as Algeria, and a slowing in national and 
international demand, all contributed to keep wine prices depre~sed.~~ 
In Catalonia, three problems had now to be overcome simultaneously:  the 
replanting ofthe dead or dying vines; the need to adapt to lower wine prices; 
and, peculiar to this region, the need for landowners to decide whether to 
renegotiate contracts with their sharecroppers as phylloxera, which had 
destroyed the vines, automatically brought thousands of vabassa movta 
contracts to an end. In Barcelona,  the province where the vabassa morta had 
its greatest importance, the area under vines fell from 132,000 hectares in 
1889 to less than 36,000 in 1898, before replanting allowed a recovery to 
11  5,000 hectares by 1906, a figure which was maintained until the Spanish 
Civil War.42  In general, however, most landowners continued to offer share- 
cropping contracts after phylloxerarather than resorting to direct cultivation. 
This persistence was despite the fact that in France's Midi technological 
change was reducing monitoring costs, allowing an increase in the scale of 
"For the wine market, see especially Lachiver, Ens, chap. 8; LouMre, Wine Revolution, chaps. 1 
and 3; and Pech, Entreprise viticole. 
J2By  1935 the figure was 121,000 hectares. The pre-phylloxera figure is given in Ministerio de 
Fomento, La  invasi6nJiloxkrica, p. 106; and the journal, Los vinos y 10s  aceites, 1891, pp. 278-79. 
Post-phylloxera figures are from Grupo de Estudios de HistoriaRural, Estadisticas  Histbricas,  p. 278. 304  Carmona and Simpson 
viticulture and the use of wage labor.43  Furthermore, while sharecropping 
had been considered as the key to the initial expansion of viticulture and the 
regional prosperity prior to phylloxera, it was now often seen as a major 
source of conflict.44  The rest of this article considers the persistence of the 
rabassa morta despite these unfavorable circumstances. 
One possibility is that new sharecropping contracts were signed in this 
period not because sharecropping was still considered to be an efficient  form 
of contract, but rather as a compromise, because neither party could rid 
themselves of the other. If that were the case, even if landowners had pre- 
ferred direct cultivation using wage labor, the cost of establishing, hectare 
by hectare, legal rights to the land and evicting the rabassers may have been 
considered excessive. Likewise, although the rabassers may have believed 
that the land belonged to them both morally and legally after they had culti- 
vated it for so long, they realized that it would be difficult and expensive to 
have this fact established by a court of law. The continuance of the rabassa 
morta as a compromise therefore might suggest path dependence: an institu- 
tion which came to be considered suboptimal was continued because estab- 
lishing an alternative would have involved excessive transaction costs. 
A path-dependence hypothesis is difficult to test in this case, but the evi- 
dence does not suggest that sharecropping continued because of any "insti- 
tutional inertia." Rather, the rabassa morta appears still to have suited both 
the landowners and rabassers. Replanting took place in Catalonia under 
conditions that were different from those in France's Midi where, as Figure 
4 shows for the dkpartement of HCrault, most replanting took place when 
wine prices were still high. As Gilles Postel-Vinay has shown, the availabil- 
ity of bank loans encouraged this replanting, especially for large estates.45 
Therefore if growers in Barcelona benefitted from the scientific advances 
achieved in southern France in the fight against phylloxera-because  the 
disease had devastated the vines earlier there-they  suffered in turn because 
their own replanting occurred after prices had collapsed, as can be seen in 
Figure 5. Little is known of Catalonia's credit markets at this time, but banks 
are likely to have been wary in lending excessively to replant the region's 
vines against a background of falling prices, especially after the 1891com-
mercial treaty limited Spain's export possibilities with France. A limited 
43 The evidence of a switchto direct cultivation  in Catalonia  is rare. An  exception  was Raventb, who 
increased the area cultivated after phylloxera to 100  hectares in 1907, employing 36 full time workers, 
with a fUrther 260 at the harvest. Raventbs, La Verema, p. 61. 
44 The Institute de Reformas Sociales (IRS) was given the task of investigating these conflicts, and 
reported in 1923. 
45 Postel-Vinay, "Debt," pp. 162-72.  Replanting in the Midi took place on the deeper, fertile soils 
of the plains rather than the stony soils of the hills. According to Planhol, the move to the plains 
required the draining of marshes, which "could only be tackled by large-scale landowners or limited 
companies with sufficient funds for the organization of drainage and irrigation." Planhol, Historical 
Geography, p. 350. The "Rabassa Morta" in Catalan Eticulture  305 
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FIGURE 4 

WINE PRICE AND AREA OF VINES IN HERAULT. 1874-19 13 

Notes: Area of pre-phylloxera vines is estimated as 200.000 hectares. 

Sources:Peck Entreprise viticole, pp. 499-500  and 5 19-20. 

credit market would help to explain why landowners continued to use share 
cropping to help offset the costly investments needed for clearing the land of 
the old vines and planting new ones. Likewise, farmers saw new sharecrop- 
ping contracts as the best way of both replacing the capital that they had lost 
with phylloxera and of sharing the greater risks associated with the new vines. 
In keeping with this interpretation, the evidence does not suggest that land- 
lords seriously contemplated alternatives, or that sharecroppers were unhappy 
with renewing contracts, at least in the initial period after phyll~xera.~~ 
While sharecropping  contracts continued to be used, legal changes altered 
agreements somewhat in this period. The 1889 civil code encouraged land- 
owners to use another sharecropping contract (arrendamiento a partes de 
fiutos), rather than the traditional rabassa morta, because the conditions for 
46 For example, in the 1890s the landowner's journal Revisfa del Institute Agricola Catalbn de San 
Zsidro dedicated very few articles to the problems associated with contracts, but numerous ones on 
replanting techniques, problems of grafting, and so on. This was also the case in the congresses held 
in SanSadumi d'Anoia(1898) andReus (1899).  Likewise, during  the difficult  interwar  years, rabassers 
in the important wine producing region of the Penedbs spoke highly of the traditional rabassa morta 
contracts. IRS, La  "rabassa morta, "p. 29. Carmona and Simpson 
1  area of vines 
FIGURE  5 

WINE PRICES AND AREA OF VINES IN BARCELONA, 1874-1913 

Notes: Area of pre-phylloxera vines taken as 100 (estimated as 130.000 hectares). 

Sources:Balcells, Elproblema agrario, pp. 376-78;  and Simpson, Agricultural Growth, pp. 36&69. 

eviction of tenants in breach of contract were considered easier. For all 
intents and purposes however, the contracts remained the same except in 
name, and indeed most contemporaries still referred to the new contracts as 
"rabassa morta." The vines were usually planted by the sharecropper, evic- 
tion could only take place when some term of the contract had been broken, 
compensation had to be paid unless the tenant was evicted, and the share- 
cropper remained the legal owner of the vines that he had planted.47  Whereas 
it is true that many of the new contracts were now shorter, their duration was 
still usually longer than the life of the post-phylloxera vines, thereby pre- 
serving the spirit of the "rabassa m~rta."~~ 
47 AS  we shall see, a number of landowners would thereatler plant vines themselves, in which cases 
the sharecropper  was not the owner. For a description  of compensation  in these circumstances,  see IRS, 
La  "Rabassa Morta, "pp. 42,89-90,  112, 192. The evidence that these legal changes did not change 
significantly the nature of the contract is to be  found in Carmona and Simpson, "A vueltas con la 
cuesti6n agrarian catalana" 
48 Thereafter, average contracts were for 30 to 50 years. The life of the post-phylloxera vines was 
only 20 to 25 years, against 50 or 60 years for the pre-phylloxeravines. Balcells, Elproblema agrario, 
pp. 68-69. An additional  problem was that neither landowner  nor sharecropper  knew how long the new 
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The problems associated with sharecropping in Catalonia after 1889  were 
not caused by  the changes in the civil code. They resulted from a marked 
increase in the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the 
part of the tenant. We shall consider two reasons why this took place, name- 
ly, changes in the nature of viticulture, and movements in relative prices. 
As we have seen, traditional viticulture depended primarily on two inputs, 
land and labor. With the rabassa morta, the sharecropper provided the labor 
and the landlord the land, with the harvest divided between the two to reflect 
a valuation of their respective contributions. The vines were the property of 
the rabasser. Phylloxera therefore destroyed both the rabasser's capital and 
his hture income. By the late nineteenth century technology was beginning 
to provide an alternative to some of the heavy inputs of labor in the tasks 
associated with replanting. Specialized machinery now existed which could 
remove the dead plants, and ploughs (vernette) drawn by winches worked 
the soil to a depth of half a meter to prepare the land for replanting. Al- 
though there appears to have been a growth in the presence of deep ploughs 
in Catalonia as vineyards were being replanted, one observer noted that 
"most of the land is worked by  sharecroppers whose only capital is their 
labor and yet, without instruments to cultivate deeply, they are capable of 
creating a vineyard with american vines." Deeper plowing, however, was 
considered essential if vine yields were to be  increased  ~ignificantly.~~ 
Therefore, growers who replanted using labor-intensive systems suffered 
lower yields than those who had the capital to rent the new machinery. Vines 
now also had to be purchased from nurseries rather than taken from a neigh- 
boring plant. Finally, the post-phylloxera  vines were much more susceptible 
to disease, requiring expenditure  on chemicals,  especially sulphur for oidium 
and cooper salts, or "Bordeaux mixture" for mildew. As Table 1 indicates, 
by the 1920s chemicals and their spraying represented almost a fifth (18.28 
percent) of annual cultivation costs. 
Thus at the precise moment when the sharecropper's capital was de- 
stroyed by disease, he was required to make significant new investments if 
the contract was to be renewed under the same terms as those that he had 
enjoyed prior to phylloxera. Many sharecroppers did not have sufficient 
resources, so instead part or all of the investment was provided by the land- 
lord. Furthermore, the choice of suitable vine stock was complicated, and 
some landlords found themselves drawn into a more active management of 
the vineyard than they had been accustomed to in the past. As a result, some 
landowners planted the new vineyards themselves using hired machinery, 
49 Rovira, in Congreso Viticolade Reus, p. 27. Roviramakes an interesting  comparison  between high 
yields and "intensive" viticulture, and low yields and less intensive viticulture which, he implies, was 
the model followed  by most sharecroppers.  As we show elsewhere  (Simpson,  "Cooperation"), the "high 
intensive" viticulture in southern France was the technological path chosen by many growers. Carmona and Simpson 
TABLE  1 

CULTIVATION COSTS IN CATALONIA (TARRAGONA) 

Annual Cultivation Costs 
Pre-Phylloxera  1900  1921 
Expenses  Pesetas  Percentage  Pesetas  Percentage  Pesetas  Percentage 
Land  36.5  21.4  65.0  15.8 
Planting costs (interest and depreciation)  44.0  25.8  112.2  27.3 
Ploughing and hoeing  61.5  36.1  118.0  28.8 
Pruning  7.5  4.4  19.5  4.8 
Chemicals  0.0  0.0  60.0  14.6 
Harvesting and transport  13.8  8.1  26.5  6.5 
Taxes  7.3  4.3  9.0  2.2 
Total  170.5  100.0  410.2  100.0 
Source:Instituto de Reformas Sociales, La Rabassa Morta, pp. 161-74. 
and then leased them on long-term contracts to the share~ropper.'~  In these 
cases, not only did sharecroppers lose ownership of the vines, but they were 
required to pass on a higher percentage of the harvest to the landowner. Even 
if it was the sharecropper who planted, and thus maintained the vines as his 
property, a higher share of the harvest was required by the landowner for his 
contribution  to the cost of chemicals and fertilizer^.^' Both the loss of owner- 
ship of the vines, and a smaller share of the harvest, reduced incentives for 
the sharecropper. 
A second problem was the movement of relative prices. Although infor- 
mation is limited, it appears that the indefinite nature of the original rabassa 
morta contracts did not create major problems before the late 1880s  (Figures 
1 and 2). Although there were important short-term movements in the rela- 
tive wine-to-wheat  price ratio, and wages-to-wine ratio, these were not suffi- 
cient to encourage a radical reassessment of the contract by either landlords 
or sharecroppers.  By contrast, between 1890 and 1930 wine prices fell both 
with respect to bread prices, and in particular with respect to wage costs 
(Figure 2).52 Even as replanting was taking place, the return on unit labor 
inputs in viticulture declined steeply compared to what could be earned by 
unskilled wage labor, whether in agriculture or industry. Given the close 
However, in these cases the sharecropper usually had to buy the vines that had been planted by the 
owner. See, for example, Instituto AgricolaCatalhde SanIsidro,  La  "rabassa  morta," pp. 434,8243. 
'' In 1923 it was noted that when the landowner  providedjust the land the sharecropper  received two- 
thirds of the harvest, much as before; when chemicals were also provided by the landowner, the share 
fell to 60 percent; finally, if the landowner also planted the vines, then the harvest was split between 
the two equally. IRS, La  "rabassa morta, "pp. 19, 93-102  and 173. As Spanish law prohibits access 
to notary records until a hundred years has elapsed, it is impossible  to examine this point more closely. 
52 The opportunity cost is difficult  to measure, but most land which was not replanted  with vines after 
phylloxera was abandoned to rough pasture, or on occasions to extensive cereals or olives. See, for 
example, Ministerio de Fomento, La invasidnjloxkrica. The "Rabassa Morta " in Catalan Eticulture  309 
TABLE 2 











Sources:Yields are from Simpson,  Agricultural Growth, pp. 368-369;  yields between 1876 and 1888 
assumed on 18 hectolitres. prices are from Balcells, ~lpjoblema  agrario, pp. 377-378,  deflated by 
Maluquer de Motes, "Precios,"  tables 12.11, 12.12, and 12.16. 
proximity of the rapidly growing and prosperous industrial city of Barce- 
lona, which saw its population jump  from around 270,000 in  1887 to 
1,006,000 in 1930, it is not surprising that sharecroppers  felt that their living 
standards were slipping compared to other groups of workers. 
The loss of ownership of the vines for some sharecroppers, a reduced 
share of the harvest for others, and the increase in the opportunity cost of 
sharecroppers' labor, all imply that the incentives for postcontractual oppor- 
tunistic behavior increased significantly.  Landlords seem to have perceived 
this problem, and thus to identify with greater clarity in the contracts how 
sharecroppers were required to cultivate the vines, suggesting an important 
increase in monitoring costs if the vines were to be cultivated according to 
the "us i costum de bonpag&s."Yet the sharecropper's loss was not neces- 
sarily the landowner's gain. Higher vine yields and the larger share of the 
harvest that landowners enjoyed were not sufficient to offset the combina- 
tion of higher production costs and weaker wine prices, with Table 2 show-
ing a decline of 16 percent in output between the periods 1876 to 1890 and 
190  1 to 1935. Both landowners and sharecroppers  therefore found cause for 
complaint, and as we shall see this provided the background for first a de- 
cline in social capital and then open conflict between the two groups. 
Another problem facing both landowners and sharecroppers by the early 
twentieth century was that the rising cost of labor and declining wine prices 
in real terms everywhere were leading to greater competition between pro- 
ducers. Whereas in Catalonia production remained essentially based on the 
family farm, in other regions, such as France's Midi, there was an increase 310  Carmona and Simpson 
in the size of vineyards, with those of more than 40 hectares (producing over 
2,000 hectoliters of wine) accounting for 48 percent of the harvest by  1897 
to 1902.53  With greater scale came a significant increase in investment per 
hectare so that, although the area under vines in the Midi was close in the 
late 1920s to what it had been in the early 1870s, yields had increased by 
two-third~.~~ To work larger vineyards growers in the Midi reduced signifi- 
cantly the monitoring problems in the use of wage labor outlined earlier. In 
part this was achieved through changes in technology. Vines were increas- 
ingly hung from trellises in long lines to facilitate the use of ploughs be- 
tween the lines. As supervisors could easily walk between the rows to check 
an individual's work, they achieved greater control over the speed and the 
quality of operations such as pruning, spraying,  cultivation, and harve~ting.~~ 
Trellises were not generally used in Catalonia, in part because the density of 
vines per hectare was less than in the Midi. The phylloxera devastation, 
however, allowed amore rational planting in Catalonia  too, which facilitated 
the greater use of ploughs and fewer problems in carrying out, and in theory 
of monitoring, other operations. 
The real difference between these two regions would seem to lie else- 
where. In the Midi the increase in importance of large estates of over 40 
hectares was accompanied by a similar increase of those of less than  10 
hectares. Skilled labor was required on the large estates, especially for prun- 
ing, and this was initially obtained from the locally resident smallholders. 
Patronage appears to have played an important role, with the large owners 
lending equipment and the use of their wineries to small vintners in return 
for labor services on their estates after phyll~xera.~~  In this case the demand 
for skilled labor on the estates and the excess supply on the small farms 
reinforced each other. Monitoring costs were kept low both by the greater 
ease in measuring work quality and by  the fact that small growers were 
interested in being recruited from one year to the next for seasonal work. 
Improved monitoring increasingly  allowed labor to be recruited from outside 
the village, including from S~ain.~'  Laura Frader notes the appearance of 
gang labor (colles),which consisted of 10 to 15 skilled vinedressers who 
contracted for employment, which had the advantage that both organization 
and monitoring was effectively s~bcontracted.~~  Behind this success in the 
Midi in controlling monitoring costs was the ability of large producers to 
'' Between 1871172and 1927-1929 yields in the Midi increased from 37 hectoliters  to 61 hectoliters. 
Pech, Entreprise viticole, pp.  142, 149. By contrast, in Barcelona yields rose by  a half, from  18 
hectoliters to 27 hectoliters. See Table 2. 
54 Yields refer to 1871172 and 1927-1929. Pech, Entreprise viticole, pp. 496-98.
''Guyot, Tratado,p. 19. The importance of this was emphasized to us by Ann Carlos. 
56 Frader, Peasants, p. 36. 
''Smith, "Work Routine," p. 371. 
Frader, Peasants, pp. 75,92. The "Rabassa Morta " in Catalan fiticulture  3 11 
identify their own economic problems with those of the whole region, mak- 
ing it easier to search for political solutions, a feature which was in direct 
contrast to that in Catalonia. 
The increasing share of the harvest that sharecroppers in Catalonia now 
had to give to the landowner, and the growing opportunity cost of their 
labor, reduced the incentive to work the vines carefully. The interwar years 
were marked by  both rapid industrialization and growing nationalism in 
Catalan society, and it was this combination which helped turn what was 
essentially an economic problem of low wine prices into a political one of 
landownership.  In complete  contrast withFrance's Midi, where the problems 
of low wine prices in the early 1900s  helped cement the interests of the large 
estate owners (propie'taires) with the small growers (cultivateurs), and led 
to the  founding of a  pressure  group for the  sector, the  Confederation 
Generale Des Vignerons du Midi, in Catalonia low prices divided landown- 
ers and sharecroppers into two conflicting political groups.S9  Catalan land- 
owners, through organizations such as the Federaci6n Agricola Catalana- 
Balear or the Instituto Agricola Catalan de San Isidro, lobbied the govern- 
ment for reduced land taxes or a fiscal solution to low wine prices, while 
their congresses limited themselves to discussion of the technical problems 
related to the planting of the new American vines. By contrast, whereas the 
legal claims of most sharecroppers  to full ownership of the land which they 
worked were weak, the growing conflicts within Catalan society  encouraged 
the rabassers to look for a distributional solution (namely full ownership), 
rather than a sectorial one (incentives to limit wine fraud, reduced taxation, 
and so on, as was the case with small growers in Fran~e).~'  This polarization 
of Catalan society inevitably had important consequences for the efficiency 
of sharecropping and greatly encouraged opportunistic behavior on the part 
of the sharecropper. 
Ideally, we should measure the efficiency of the rabassa morta by com- 
paring productivity of vineyards using the contract with those using wage 
labor in the same region. Although this is not possible in Catalonia, the 
circumstantial evidence does suggest that the large farms of the Midi (or 
those of La Mancha and Algeria) were better able to cope with the low wine 
prices of the interwar period than small sharecropping farms in Catal~nia.~~ 
Crucially, growers in the Midi appear to have been more successful than 
59 For the Midi see especially Smith, "Work Routine" and "Agricultural Workers." 
60 TheUni6 de Rabassaires de Cataluyna's program in 1923 contained no point whichwas not related 
to redistribution of power or income to them from the landlord. Quoted in Balcells, El problema 
agrario, pp. 383-84.  The only area where landowners and sharecroppers  joined forces was in a few 
wine cooperatives, and even then several localities ended up having two cooperatives, one for the 
landowners and one for sharecroppers. 
61 For Algeria, see Galtier, Le vignoble,vol. 3, pp. 112-218;  for La Mancha, see Simpson, Spanish 
Agriculture, p. 2 10. Carmona and Simpson 
their counterparts in Catalonia, both in increasing yields through the use of 
more and better inputs, while at the same time overcoming the traditional 
problems associated  with monitoring. Contemporaries  themselves were well 
aware of how by the twentieth century sharecropping had become a source 
of friction in the region. Whereas previously the contract had  allowed a 
successful  partnership between landowner and rabasser, the changing nature 
of viticulture and the economic, social, and political changes associated with 
a rapidly developing industrial economy now encouraged conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we have argued that for over two centuries the rabassa 
morta contract successfully balanced the need to provide incentives to the 
sharecropper,  with that of allowing  the landowner  to participate in the fluctu- 
ating fortunes of the local wine economy. With the development of a more 
capital intensive viticulture in the early twentieth century, which increas- 
ingly provided opportunities to achieve economies of scale, and with the 
more demanding nature of planting new vines after phylloxera, these favor- 
able conditions were eroded. The share of the harvest that growers received 
declined, which reduced their incentives in the cultivation of the vine. At the 
same time, wine prices fell in real terms and real wages soared, which in- 
creased the opportunity cost of sharecroppers' labor. By the period 1930 to 
1934  wages of an unskilled agricultural  male laborer in the Penedes were the 
equivalent of four times the quantity of wine that he would have earned in 
the period 1880 to 1884; yields, by  contrast, had increased by only a half, 
and the area under vines per rabasser seems to have remained ~nchanged.~~ 
But the weakness of wine prices and rising real wages were not the only 
causes of the increasing conflicts between sharecroppers and landowners. 
Wider changes in Spanish society, and particularly that of Catalonia, led to 
a radicalization of politics and the claim by sharecroppers  for full ownership 
of the land. In such a climate the level of social capital (trust) declined sig- 
nificantly, increasing problems of monitoring and moral hazard for the 
owner. Sharecropping  was no longer considered as an efficient contract, but 
rather as exploitative and unjust by the rabassers and their political allies. 
We conclude that although sharecropping in traditional agriculture can be 
surprisingly resilient, the changes that take place with modernization of agri- 
culture are likely to shift rapidly the rewards to one party, at the cost of the 
other. In particular, the growing opportunity cost of the sharecropper's labor 
inthe face of rapid urbanization implies that unless contracts can be frequently 
renegotiated, there will be a significant increase in postcontractual opportunis- 
tic behavior and, hence, criticism of the unjust nature of the contract. 
Sources are the same as Figure 2 and Table 2. The "Rabassa Morta " in Catalan Eticulture  3 13 
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